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|THE JOINT AMERICAN ASTRONAUTICAL SOCIETY--L5 SOCIETY
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|CONFERENCE ON PLANNING AMERICA'S FUTURE IN SPACE.

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|STATEMENT ON PROPOSED FY 82 NASA BUDGET


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|SPACE: THE CRUCIAL FRONTIER


        1.  The |rediscovery of progress| is a reasonable and feasible
national goal for the United States in the 1980's.
        Progress is possible.  We do not have to accept limits to
growth; but we do need specific strategies for progress.  Growth
requires investment and continuous expansion of the resource base.

        The United States has a world mission.  We influence by
example; we are the showplace of freedom; and in the present era we
must also be the sword and shield of liberty.  To fulfill this role we
must do more than survive.  We must remain militarily, economically,
and ideologically strong.
        We need visible goals: a reason for the nation to exist.  If
we have no dreams and goals, we have no nation.
        Insuring progress for ourselves and the world is a reasonable
and feasible goal for America.  Space activities can be a significant
part of our rediscovery of progress.

        2.  The vast majority of resources accessible to mankind are
NOT here on Earth.  The solar system abounds with minerals and energy.
Other nations are even now claiming those resources and developing
capabilities for using them.  If the United States does not compete,
we will have effectively abdicated economic leadership to those who
do.
    There is more at stake than that.  Space has very great military
potential.  Although no one is certain that strategically decisive
weapons can be deployed in space, no reasonable person can be certain
that they can |not| be.  Space based beam weapons may develop into
reliable missile defenses.  At the very least, the United States
|must| retain the option to compete in space.
        Space also has symbolic importance, if for no other reason
than the United States made the "Moon race" critical to our national
prestige.  To abandon space after announcing its crucial importance
hands the Soviets an unearned but enormously important ideological
victory.  It is obvious from their space activities that the Soviets
realize this.  We must, therefore, retain the option to move
effectively and quickly into space.
        Retaining that option is not simple.  No one can be sure what
capabilities will be needed.  Our adversaries have more experience in
the space environment than we do.
        Since we cannot know which space capabilities may prove to be
decisive, we cannot design robots or artificial intelligence systems
in advance.  The only truly versatile space system is man; and the
only way to insure a capability to do a wide variety of tasks in
space--including construction of the military systems that may be
needed in future--is to make entry to and operations in the space
environment routine.
        We must continue both manned and unmanned exploration of
space.  Our survival may depend on it.

  AAS--L5 Statement on FY 82 Budget                  Page Two

        3.  The "Revoluton of Rising Expectations" concides with the
"era of limits" to aggravate international instabilities.  Most of the
world will remain poor in the remaining years of this century--and
this in a "global village".  The wretched of the Earth are very much
aware that everyone doesn't live their way.  World economic growth is
not merely desirable on ethical grounds; it is very much in the U.S.
national interest.
        Rapid economic growth is not easy.  It requires investment.
It also requires technological growth, and expanded resources.  We
cannot abandon technology; indeed, we must rapidly expand our entire
technological and industrial base.

        4.  All the above factors combine to make space an important
option.  To preserve and increase capabilities for military activities
in space we must expand our space activities.  If we are to extend our
technological base, we must actively seek renewed interest in the hard
disciplines of science and engineering.  The economic growth of the
U.S. and the world will be enhanced by exploitation of the space
environment.  Ignoring space abandons the major resource base of the
next century.

        5.  Retaining space options is time dependent.  The lead time
for space activities is long.  Decisions made NOW in 1981 have
consequences stretching far into the future.  Decisive programs must
be underaken NOW or many capabilities will be lost; and once lost,
they cannot be regained without costly and wasteful crash programs.
Much that we should accomplish before 1988 cannot be done without
immediate changes in our national space policies.

        6.  The space question is crucial: if we do not preserve space
options, we are betting national survival in order to save a miniscule
fraction of the national budget.  This is neither reasonable nor
prudent.

        7.  It is also possible to make space pay for itself--indeed,
to use space to feed a new period of rapid economic growth.  The
opportunities are there.  The resources and energy are there.  It is
now obvious that some nations will gain great wealth from space.  The
only controversy is over the time scale.

        8.  If humanity survives at all--which we fully expect--then
there is no doubt that civilizations in the centuries to come will
spread across the entire solar system.  As Arthur Clarke has said,
except for a fleeting instant in the beginning of history, the word
'ship' will mean space ship.
        This generation can take mankind and freedom into the solar
system.  Much can be lost by delay; still more can be gained by
beginning now.  |The nation and statesmen who give mankind the planets
will be remembered forever.

  AAS--L5 Statement on FY 82 Budget                     Page Three



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|PRESERVING SPACE OPTIONS.


        The United States needs, but does not have, a comprehensive
strategy for exploiting space.  We must have a unified plan which
abandons the artificial division of space into "military" and
"civilian" programs.
        Such a plan cannot be devised in a few days.  Space plans are
by nature technologically complex, and require considerable study.
However, it is clear that certain capabilities ought to be preserved,
so that strategists will retain a full menu of options.
        These options must include the capability to:
                Move quickly to a permanent manned presence in space.
                Develop economic returns from the space investment.
        The FY 1982 NASA Budget prepared by the previous
Administration forecloses significant options which should be
preserved.  We therefore recommend that the following items be added
to the FY 82 budget as insurance.  Note that we do NOT recommend that
all of these systems be constructed; but we do think it vital that
they remain possible.
        While the costs of these systems is not low, it is small
compared to many other elements of the national budget; and the
options retained thereby may be vital to the preservation of the
United States in future times.

FY 82 recommendatons

1.  LEO BASE ONE         (Space Industrial Park)
        FY 82 Funds required:   $5 million
        TOTAL SYSTEM COST:      $4 billion
        System Operational Capability: 1988
        Preliminary plans already exist for LEO Base under the concept
of the Space Operations Center; a general-purpose permanently manned
space station capable of supporting privately-financed space
industrial activities.  It may be thought of as a "space industrial
park".
        LEO Base One could be the most important new start of this
decade.  It will place the U.S. permanently in space, demonstrating
unequivocally that we have not abandoned the high frontier to the
Soviet Union.  Moreover, this operations facility provides
opportunities for the creative energies of private enterprise to be
brought to this crucial area.  It has been the historic role of
goverment to build roads to new frontiers and protect the early
settlers.  This space facility meets that need.
        LEO Base One also provides a splendid opportunity for
international cooperation.  Its modular design would allow not merely
experiments, but industrial research and development, in cooperation
with allies and friends.
        The total cost of the LEO Base, ready for operations, is
approximately $4 billion in 1981 dollars.
        The space station has a significant possibility of bringing a
very high return on investment.  We might get filthy rich from it.
        LEO Base One could be made operational before 1988 if
intelligent management and procurement procedures are employed.

AAS--L5 Statement on FY 82 Budget                             Page Four

        We have studied the possibilities of having significant
hardware components of LEO Base One in orbit by Fall of 1984.  We
conclude that while this is possible, it is a high-risk venture, and
requires an immediate crash program to be given highest national
priority.  It does not cost a great deal more in total costs to go for
the 1984-85 target date, but it does require more money invested much
earlier in the program.

 2.  Halley Comet Flyby (Scientific/ National Prestige)
                FY 82           $20 Million
                TOTAL COST:     $600 Million
        The Halley mission is the only competition with the Soviets
that is fixed in advance.  We will look good if we try it.  We will
show that we have not abandoned space to others.
        Halley's Comet will be visible in the solar system in 1986-87.
Unlike the Kahoutek "Christmas Comet", Halley's has been known for
centuries, and has never disappointed us yet.  It is likely to be
spectacular.
        There is very little that the United States can do in 1986-87
that will be impressive in comparison with the known Soviet space
capabilities and intentions.  Therefore, it is reasonable to exploit
the few advantages we have--and the capability for spectacular
pictures from within the gasseous coma of Halley's Comet is nearly
certain.  The mission could fail, but that is highly unlikely.
        The Halley Comet mission requires an immediate funding of $20
million.  If that is not put in the FY 82 budget, the opportunity is
lost for this generation.

3.  Space Solar Power Systems
                FY 82           $30 Million
                TOTAL SYSTEM COST   Up to $200 Billion
                Systems Operational Capability   1990-2000

        Although the most spectacular use of Space Solar Power Systems
is to provide electricity for Earth, they will also be vital for
exploitation of space resources.
        There is no question that Space Solar Power Systems will
←work.← Many expensive studies have proved that.  The controversy is
over the economics of using them as a means of providing significant
electric power to Earth.  (One currently considered design would have
each satellite generate as much electricity as does Grand Coulee Dam.)
         There are sufficient uncertainties as to preclude making
Space Solar Power Systems a national goal at this time.
        HOWEVER: the option to build Space Solar Power Systems should
be preserved and the economic feasibility of the concept investigated.
        A reasonable funding level for this kind of space power system
for FY 82 would be $30 million.  Most of that would go to technology
studies; the resulting technology will be useful for other space
programs, including development of long-term capabilities for
exploitation of lunar resources.  Therefore, the money spent in the
Space Solar Power Systems program is largely a recoverable investment.
        As an aside, most investments in technology have more than
paid for themselves.  Knowledge is indivisible, and is useful no
matter under which program it is developed.

  AAS--L5 Statement on FY 82 Budget                    Page Five

        The Space Solar Power Systems option adds another means of
national survival.  Our present energy policies are unlikely to
provide the energy resources for rapid industrial growth until the
year 2000.  The Space Solar Power Systems option is cheap insurance
against failure of more conventional energy supplies--and all the
money for Space Solar Power Systems is spent in the US, developing US
technological capabilities.

4.  ASTEROID OR LUNAR POLAR INVESTIGATION
        Industrial Exploitation with strong Scientific Value
        FY 82   $50 Million
        TOTAL SYSTEM COST       Under $300 Million
        Mission Completion: Before Fall 1984

        Note that this is the only new start that could begin and go
to completion before 1985.

        APOLLO gave us valuable knowledge about 20% of the lunar
surface.  This knowledge can be rapidly and economically extended to
the entire lunar surface by means of an unmanned satellite in a polar
orbit around the Moon.  A large number of well-conducted scientific
and engineering studies have defined the mission, which employs
off-the-shelf spacecraft.
        The lunar polar mission can discover an even greater range of
useful resources than were found by Apollo.  It may confirm the
existence of vast quantities of water ice, which theory predicts must
exist in the eternally cold polar regions.
        Instrumentation for the lunar polar mission would be
applicable to exploration of asteroids, other moons, possible
near-Earth space debris, and planets with tenuous atmospheres.
        Asteroids are a potential source for a variety of industrial
raw materials.  Investigation of asteroids will expand the potential
material resource base for the United States and all of humanity.
This mission is important for eventual exploitation of space
resources, and also commands great support within the scientific
community.
        Either or both of these missions: asteroid or lunar
polar--could be accomplished in 1984 (if we begin now).  Much of the
equipment--satellite and launch vehicle--required for either mission
is common to both. Thus, provided that we commit now to doing one of
the missions, we have a few months in which to decide which one
actually to accomplish.


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|CONCLUSION

        The above recommendations preserve significant options at
relatively low cost.  This will allow more liesurely study and the
development of a comprehensive national space policy.  Failure to
preserve these options dictates a number of limits on our space
program in advance of development of an integrated space policy and
plan.
        A comprehensive strategy for using space as a means to pursue
vital national interests is urgently needed.  It should not be
crippled in advance through pretended savings.
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